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Abstract: 
 
This paper compares the comovement of individual stock returns across emerging markets.   
Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000) show that the US in the post war period saw rising 
firm specific stock return variations and thus declining comovement. We detect a similar, albeit 
weaker, pattern in most, but not all, emerging markets. We further find that higher firm-specific 
variation is associated with greater capital market openness, but not goods market openness. 
Moreover, this relationship is magnified by institutional integrity (good government).  Goods market 
openness is associated with higher market-wide variation.   1 
The price system is just one of those formations which man has learned to use (though he is still very 
far from having learned to make the best use of it) after he has stumbled upon it without 
understanding it.   
Friedrich August von Hayek (1945) 
1.  Introduction 
The extent to which individual stock prices move independently varies both across countries and 
over time.  Morck et al. (2000) find the ratio of idiosyncratic (firm-specific) variation to total 
variation in individual stock returns to be higher in higher-income economies in the mid 1990s.  
Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000) find a long-term rise in idiosyncratic variation in US 
stock returns.  A series of studies, including Wurgler (2000), Bris et al. (2002), Bushman et al. 
(2002), Durnev et al. (2004, 3a,b), and others, relate greater idiosyncratic variation, or lower 
comovement in individual stock returns, to a range of measures of the institutional development, 
regulatory sophistication, and capital allocation efficacy of the stock market.  Other work, too 
extensive to list, documents a relationship between financial development and economic openness.  
This study documents a strong statistical correlation between capital market openness in emerging 
markets and idiosyncratic stock return variation.  We focus on emerging markets because developed 
stock markets are fully open to foreign investors for the full period over which large panels of returns 
data are available. 
  We first show that the findings of Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000) of rising 
idiosyncratic variation in US stocks are also evident in the majority of emerging markets over the 
1990s.  We then show that higher idiosyncratic variation is significantly correlated with greater 
capital market openness in emerging market economies with sound institutions.  However, capital 
market openness and poor institutions may actually increase comovement.  Trade openness generally 
increases comovement.   
  The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section two describes our conceptual 2 
starting points.  Section three describes our methodology and section four presents our 
empirical findings.  Section five presents a case study and section six concludes.   
 
2.  Individual Stock Return Comovement and Openness 
The total variation in an individual stock return can be decomposed into idiosyncratic variation, which is 
specific to the stock, and systematic variation, which is explained by market returns.  A natural measure 
of comovement is thus systematic variation as a fraction of total variation. Since comovement can be 
large either because systematic variation is large or because idiosyncratic variation is small, it also makes 
sense to look at these quantities explicitly.  For brevity, we refer to all of these variables as measuring 
“comovement”.”  
Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000) document rising absolute and relative firm-
specific variation in US stocks.  Morck et al. (2000) also find that firm-specific variation is a greater 
part of total variation in more developed countries.  They are unable to explain these differences with 
differences in macroeconomic stability, country or market size, economy structure, or firm-specific 
variation in fundamentals (returns on assets).  Rather, greater official corruption is highly correlated 
with more comovement; and, in countries with below average corruption, stronger investor 
protection laws are associated with higher firm-specific variation.   
Comovement and related phenomena matter for two general classes of reasons.  These 
reasons interact with the increasing global integration of capital markets, as documented by Bekaert 
and Harvey (1995, 1997) and others.   
The first class of reasons relates to portfolio risk.  Campbell et al. (2001) note that many 
investors are not fully diversified, and so are exposed to greater risk when firm-specific variation is 
greater.  They further show that greater firm-specific variation means investors need larger portfolios 
to diversify fully and argue that greater firm-specific variation should affect option prices, which 
depend on firm-specific plus market-related variation in the return of the underlying asset.   3 
Chen and Knez (1995) argue that, as barriers to capital flows drop, cross-border arbitrage 
affects asset prices across markets.  Thus, information about industries, exposures or discount rates 
that affects prices in one country also affects prices elsewhere.  Some of this information is about the 
whole market, but much is about sectors, and should show up as idiosyncratic risk.   
The second class of reasons has to do with the real economy.  We now review each of these 
reasons in turn.   
First, La Porta et al. (1999) find most large publicly traded firms outside the United States 
and United Kingdom organized into corporate groups.  A single controlling shareholder, usually a 
very wealthy family, controls all the firms in such a group – directly or indirectly.  Group firms 
finance each other, do business with each other, adopt common strategies, and otherwise coordinate 
decisions.  This could give their fundamentals a common component.  Such intercorporate dealings 
might steadily transfer wealth from one group firm to another, and public shareholders of a wealth-
losing group firm understandably view this as a corporate governance problem, which Johnson et al. 
(2000) dub tunneling.  Perhaps comovement gauges the importance of corporate groups, and of 
tunneling.   
As Coffee (2002), Karolyi and Stulz (2003), Morck et al. (2000b), Rajan and Zingales 
(2003), Stulz (1999), and others note, capital market openness pressures regulators to adopt 
international best practices in disclosure, governance, and regulation.  It also creates local demand for 
information professionals, like accountants and analysts.  Both changes might render tunneling more 
difficult.  The result might be less comovement in both firm fundamentals and returns.   
Second, economic growth arises from technological progress.  Schumpeter (1912) holds that 
this occurs as innovative firms rise to displace established industry leaders in a process he dubs 
creative destruction.  More intense creative destruction thus causes the fundamentals of innovative 
and laggard firms to differ more.   
Caves (1982) argues that openness to outward foreign direct investment (FDI) raises the 4 
rewards to innovators by allowing greater economies of scale, and that openness to inward FDI 
allows technology spillovers from multinationals to local firms.  Rajan and Zingales (2003) and 
Morck  et al. (2000b) argue that foreign portfolio investment (FPI) openness bolsters local 
technological progress by letting entrepreneurial upstarts obtain financing from abroad. Thus, general 
capital market openness might let innovative firms outpace sedate rivals faster, magnifying firm 
specific differences in returns.   
Third, neoclassical trade theory links trade openness to specialization.  Trade openness 
should thus reduce an economy’s diversification across industries, perhaps turning industry factors 
into market factors and raising fundamentals comovement.  Also, if capital openness accompanies 
trade openness, a positive correlation between capital openness and comovement might ensue.   
However, tunneling, innovation, and specialization all affect returns comovement only by 
affecting fundamentals comovement.  Morck et al. (2000) cannot explain returns comovement with 
fundamentals (return on assets) comovement.
1  Either their fundamentals comovement measure is 
inadequate, a possibility given the low frequency of fundamentals data, or some other explanation is 
paramount.   
The latter possibility leads them to consider alternative explanations.  Comovement may be 
symptomatic of market inefficiencies, such as bubbles or herding.  If more open capital markets 
experience fewer bubbles and less herding, they might exhibit less comovement.  Alternatively, 
critics of globalization argue that openness spreads crises.  For example, the Bernama News Agency 
quoted Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad blaming Malaysia’s economic crisis on 
international financiers who “robbed the Palestinians of everything, but in Malaysia they could not 
                                                           
1 Morck et al.  (2000)  run market-model analog regressions on returns on assets, defined as earnings 
plus depreciation plus interest over net assets.  This allows them to estimate firm-specific and 
systematic fundamentals variation.  Controlling for these variables does not affect their results.   5 
do so, hence they do this, depress the ringgit.”
2  More sagaciously, Bhagwati (1998) argues that 
capital market openness can spread financial crises, and that only product market openness is 
justified; and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) study contagion as a factor in market fluctuations.   
However, Morck et al. (2000) and Campbell et al. (2001) show that changes in comovement 
are due, in part at least, to changes in idiosyncratic variation, as opposed to market wide variation.  
Roll (1988) argues that idiosyncratic variation reflects trading by investors with private firm-specific 
information, and Morck et al. (2000) and Durnev et al. (2004) speculate that more idiosyncratic 
variation reflects periods of especially intense trading by such investors, and hence more accurate 
pricing, at least in the short term.  However, Campbell et al. (2001) dispute this, noting correctly that 
West (1988) links less information to higher returns variation.  Their intuition is that as information 
is revealed, the previously more erroneously priced stock exhibits larger return fluctuations.   
Regardless, a growing body of empirical work links greater idiosyncratic variation to 
variables that, on the surface at least, are plausible proxies for the information content of stock prices.  
Some of this work links higher firm-specific return variation to variables readily interpretable as 
gauging informed arbitrage.  Greater idiosyncratic variation is evident in countries with stronger 
insider trading prohibitions (Beny, 2000), more developed financial analysis industries and a freer 
press (Bushman et al. 2002), and fewer short sales restrictions (Bris et al. 2002).  Other work looks at 
the information content of stock returns more directly.  Durnev et al. (2003b) find significantly 
higher firm-specific returns variation following a major historical tightening in US disclosure law for 
affected stocks, but not for others.  Durnev et al. (2003a) find returns more accurately predicting 
future earnings changes in industries whose stocks move more idiosyncratically.  Collins et al. 
(1987) and others regard such predictive power as gauging the ‘information content’ of stock prices.  
                                                           
2 From an October 10
th 1997 speech to Muslim villagers, quoted in “Malaysia Premier Sees Jews 
Behind Nation's Money Crisis,” by Seth Mydans, New York Times, October 16, 1997. 6 
Yet more work links greater idiosyncratic variation to better quality capital allocation.  Wurgler 
(2000) finds capital flows more responsive to value-added in countries where returns commove less. 
Durnev et al. (2004) show US industries in which idiosyncratic variation is higher exhibiting fewer 
signs of both overinvestment and underinvestment.  Tobin (1982) defines the market as functionally 
efficient if price changes induce efficient capital allocation, and the two studies speculate that less 
comovement and greater idiosyncratic variation signify more functionally efficient markets.   
Reconciling these findings with the West (1988) framework and related literature, such as Campbell 
and Shiller (1987), is an exciting avenue for future research.   
Our objective here is more limited - to see if the US pattern of rising idiosyncratic variation 
extends to emerging markets, and to see what factors correlate with the magnitudes of this change 
across countries.  In doing this, we need to consider factors that affect many countries, but to 
differing degrees.   
One such factor is the increasing globalization of capital markets.  We make no pretense that 
globalization is the only such factor.  However a study of all possible factors is beyond the scope of 
this effort.  We focus on globalization because economic openness, especially to capital flows, has 
changed to different degrees in different countries over the past decade, and in ways that can be 
measured – albeit with difficulty.  By considering how capital market openness might interact with 
the different explanations of comovement advanced above, we can explore their validity and 
implications.   
 
3.  Methodology 
Estimating the Comovement Variables 
Our main comovement measures are based on modified market model regressions for individual 
securities.  Let the return on stock j in period t be rjt., the domestic market return for country n at t be 7 
rnt, and the US market return at t be rmt (converted to local currency). To assess the comovement of 
individual stocks in country n during period τ, we run the regression   
  jt mt j njt j j jt r r r ε β β β + + + = 2 , 1 , 0 ,         [ 1 ]  
separately for each stock j ∈ n using all Tj observations t ∈ τ.  The transformed domestic market 
return,  njt r  is the equal-weighted average return of all stocks in n except j itself, 
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where Jnt is the number of stocks in country n at time t.  We thus use a different domestic market 
return for each regression.  This is because we are interested in the comovement of stock j with other 
stocks, not with itself.  In economies with a small number of traded stocks, this eliminates a potential 
upward bias in our comovement measures.   
A simple variance decomposition expresses the sum of squared variation in rjt, denoted 
2
τ j s , 
as the sum of the squared variation explained by [1], 
2
τ j ms , and the residual variation 
2
τ ε j s .  The 
systematic variation in stock j during interval τ is
2
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j− =  where Tj is the number of return observations 
for firm j in during τ. 
To estimate country-level analogs, we take an average of the Jn firm-level measures in each 
country n weighted by the number of observations on each firm.  Thus, the average absolute firm-
specific return variation for stocks in country n during interval τ is  
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We interpret a larger 
2
τ εσ n
 
as signifying less comovement in individual returns.   8 
An analogous procedure generates the average absolute systematic return variation for 
stocks in country n during time interval τ, 
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We interpret a greater 
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as signifying more comovement in individual returns.   
Scaling firm-specific by total variation, 
2
τ σ n obtained analogously as in [3] and [4], we obtain 
the average R
2 statistic of regression [1] for stocks in country n during time interval τ,   
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  To gauge the importance of systematic variation as a fraction of total variation in country n, 
we can define a country-level analog,  
2
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the average relative systematic variation in the stocks of country n during interval τ.  We take a 
lower 
2
τ n R  as signifying less comovement.   
To construct these measures, we download a time series of Wednesday-to-Wednesday returns 
for every stock in DataStream, deleting returns with zero or missing volume at either endpoint.  
Using weekly returns economizes on downloading time.  DataStream contains coding errors, 
especially for Latin America, due to misplaced decimal points.  An algorithm checks for such errors 
and drops affected observations. 
 
Regression Framework 
We seek to explain comovement with measures of openness to the global economy, taking into 
account the different levels of institutional development in different countries.  We thus run panel 9 
regressions of the form 
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We follow Morck et al. (2000) in using as dependent variables the natural logarithms of 
country-level average firm-specific variation,  ( )
2 ln τ εσ n , systematic variation,  ( )
2 ln τ σ n m , and the 
difference between them, which we denote by the Scandinavian letter ∅nτ.
3  Note that ∅nτ is a 
logistic transformation of the R
2 measure, for  
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Since 
2
τ σ n m  and 
2
τ εσ n  are bounded below by zero, and 
2
τ n R  is in the unit interval, these 
transformations are necessary to provide approximately normal dependent variables.   
We use several alternative measures to capture different aspects of openness.   
We define trade openness as suggested by Frankel (2000),  
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where Mnτ is total imports and Ynτ is gross domestic product (GDP).  If national borders do not affect 
buying patterns, imports over GDP equals one minus the nation’s share of world production, leaving 
the value of the openness measure zero.  In a completely closed economy the variable’s value is 
minus one plus the country’s GDP as a fraction of world GDP.  As the country becomes more open, 
the measure rises towards zero.  Trade openness can rise above one for an entrepôt state.  Frankel 
(2000) recommends this measure in lieu of the traditional imports plus exports over GDP, which 
tends to be larger for smaller economies.   
                                                           
3 Pronounced about halfway between “oe” and “oy”. 
 10 
We construct the variable using data from World Development Indicators 2002, produced by 
the World Bank.  For our sample, the variable is always negative.  Note, however, that we exclude 
the city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong, which are probably the most important entrepôt 
countries.  Hong Kong is a particularly unique case because of its switch from a UK colony to a 
Chinese special administration region during our sample period.  
Measuring capital market openness is more difficult, for investment stock and flow measures 
are often highly problematic.  We therefore use a carefully developed capital market openness 
measure provided by Edison et al. (2002).  This is a direct measure of the openness of each country’s 
stock market to foreign investors.  Essentially, it reflects the value of stocks that can be purchased by 
foreign investors as a percentage of total domestic market capitalization.
4  It is closer to one if a 
market is more open and closer to zero if it is more closed.   
The index is available for most emerging markets from 1990 through 2001, though it is 
unavailable for some in the very early 1990s.  Since developed country stock markets are essentially 
fully open to foreign investors throughout the 1990s, the index has no variation for these markets.  
Consequently, we restrict our attention to emerging markets.   
The capital and trade openness are not highly correlated (ρ = -0.001, p = 0.99).  Although 
                                                           
4 This measure is based on an “investable” index, reflecting the market as available to foreign 
investors, divided by a “global” index, reflecting the whole market.  Both are from the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC).  To control for “asymmetric shocks to investable and non-investable 
stocks”, the measure is adjusted using price indices computed by IFC for the two categories of 
stocks. Since the stocks available to foreigners may trade at different prices than the stocks available 
to locals, the value of stocks available to foreigners can, in theory, exceed total domestic stock 
market capitalization.  The index used in Edison et al. (2002) is actually one minus this openness 
ratio, and measures the intensity of capital controls.   11 
many countries with open capital markets have open goods markets, there are notable exceptions:  
Indonesia (capital market openness rises, while trade openness shows no consistent trend), Malaysia 
and the Philippines (capital market openness shows no consistent trends, but trade openness rises), 
and Pakistan (capital market openness rises while the goods market becomes more closed).   
To assess institutional development, we use the good government measure constructed by 
Morck et al. (2000).  This measure sums three variables from La Porta et al. (1999) that gauge: the 
respect a country’s government shows for the rule of law, the efficiency of a country’s legal system, 
and the freedom of its government and civil servants from corruption.  Each individual measure 
ranges from zero to ten, so good government lies between zero and thirty, with higher numbers 
connoting better institutions.  This variable is available only as a cross-section.   
All our regressions control for country, year, and crisis fixed effects.   
Including country fixed effects nets out own-country averages.  We do this because Morck et 
al. (2000) link comovement to a variety of variables having to do with economy structure, economy 
size, and fundamentals comovement.  We have no reliable measures of how these factors change 
through time for each country, and therefore subsume them into general fixed effects.  We recognize 
that this may not capture their full effects.  If their changes are correlated with changing openness, 
our openness variable might pick up effects that, more properly, should be ascribed to changes in 
these other variables.  If these other effects are, themselves, also associated with economic openness, 
this is defensible.  If they are not, we must interpret our openness variable more broadly, as perhaps 
capturing part of a broader range of institutional or other changes.  Year fixed effects capture global 
macroeconomic factors, and control for any general time trend in our data.   
A number of emerging economies experienced financial crises during the 1990s.  Hence, we 
include three crisis dummies to capture transitory changes in comovement associated with the 
unusual conditions prevailing in the affected markets.  An Asian crisis dummy is one for East Asian 
countries in 1997 and 1998, and zero otherwise.  A Mexican peso crisis is one for Latin American 12 
countries in 1995, and zero otherwise.  Finally, a Brazilian real crisis dummy is one for Latin 
American countries in 1998, and zero otherwise.   
 
Sample 
Table 1 lists the countries in our final sample.  The list of countries in Table 1 is the intersection of 
those for which the Edison et al. (2002) capital openness measure is available, those for which the 
good government index is available, and those for which DataStream stock returns are available.  We 
go back only to 1990s because stock return data for earlier years are unavailable on DataStream for 
many countries.  We thus have annual comovement measures from 1990 to 2001 for most countries.  
We require that five years of comovement data be available to include a country in our panel.  Our 
trade openness variable is unavailable for Taiwan (ROC).   
The resulting panel contains annual measures for seventeen countries from 1990 to 2001 with 
183 country-year observations.  We have less than a full panel because data for some countries are 
unavailable in the early 1990s.  Table 1 displays univariate statistics. 
 
4.  Findings 
Figure 1 summarizes the pattern across all emerging economies.  Panel A, weighting each country 
equally, reveals falling 
2
τ n R  and 
2
τ σ n m , and rising
2
τ εσ n , though none are monotonic.  Panel B, 
weighting each stock equally with no regard to its country, reveals a similar picture.   
  Table 2 presents a statistical description of the patterns in Figure 1.  Because we have only 
twelve observations, lag estimation and unit root tests are problematic. Still, Panel A shows 
consistent positive trend point estimates in tests with and without 1
st order lags and both assuming 
and disavowing a unit root.  Unfortunately, statistical significance is only sporadic.  For comparison, 
we present the same tests using US data for 1990 to 2001, and obtain similarly inconclusive findings, 13 
and even a positive trend in R
2.  When we extend the US data back to 1963 (not shown), we 
reproduce the trends detected by Campbell et al.  (2001) and Morck et al. (2000) - a rising 
2
ε σ  and a 
declining R
2.   
  Panel B estimates
2
τ εσ n , 
2
τ σ n m , and
2
τ n R  from firm data for the first and last halves of our 
sample period – dropping the middle two years to mitigate autocorrelation problems.  F tests show an 
unambiguous rise in firm specific variation, a smaller rise in systematic variation, and a resultant 
decline in 
2
τ n R
 – all highly significant.  As a robustness check, we conduct a bootstrapping (B) test by 
recalculating the average first subperiod
2
τ εσ n , 
2
τ σ n m , and
2
τ n R  in each country one hundred times 
using thirty randomly selected stocks each time.  This generates a distribution for the first subperiod 
average firm-specific variation.  The p-level for rejecting equal average firm-specific variation in the 
two subperiods is the tail of this distribution beyond the second subperiod sample
2
τ εσ n , 
2
τ σ n m , 
or
2
τ n R .  These tests show a significant rise in firm-specific variation in emerging markets as a whole, 
a smaller increase in systematic variation, and an insignificant decline in R
2.  Analogous US figures 
for the same period show a rise in 
2
τ σ n m , and
2
τ n R in the 1990s, however this is again a short term 
phenomenon.  Similar techniques applied over a longer time-series of US data, from 1963 to 2001, 
confirm the rising
2
τ εσ n  and falling
2
τ n R  noted by Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000). 
The last panel of Table 2 reproduces the trend tests and subsample tests from Panels A and B 
for each individual emerging market.  Of the sixty-eight trend point estimates, forty-seven are 
positive, and eight are statistically significant - consistent with broadly rising firm-specific variation.  
In contrast, only two of the twenty-one negative trend estimates are significant.  F-tests and 
bootstrapping tests are more definitive, indicating significantly higher firm-specific variation in 
twelve of our seventeen emerging markets - Colombia, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Taiwan, and Thailand.  F-tests indicate declining firm-14 
specific variation only in Brazil, Chile, Greece, Peru, and Turkey; and bootstrapping tests are 
significant only for Chile, Peru, and Turkey.   
Space constraints prevent the inclusion of detailed descriptions of our other co-movement 
variables.  Twelve of our seventeen countries show a decline in 
2
τ n R  measured analogously.  In 
eleven countries, 
2
τ σ n m rises. During crisis years,
2
τ εσ n and 
2
τ σ n m both spike.  Because the latter rises 
more, 
2
τ n R  also spikes. These observations are unsurprising, at least on the surface.
5   
As a robustness check, we repeat the F and B tests in Table 2 using the first and last pairs of 
years of data for each country, rather than the first and last halves of the sample period, and generate 
broadly similar results.  Unit root invariant trend tests, as suggested by Vogelsang (1998), indicate 
uniform insignificance, but are barely identified.   
Our focus is on how openness and institutions correlate with comovement.  These same 
factors may affect the virility and incidence of crises, so crises cannot really be disentangled from 
them.  However, a thorough analysis of the interactions of crises with institutions, openness, and 
stock return variation is beyond the scope of this study, though we are pursuing it elsewhere.   
Nonetheless, we clearly must control for transitory effects during crises when we evaluate the 
determinants of their more permanent levels.  We return to this issue below.   
Table 3 reports our regression results.  The leftmost panel shows no relationship between 
trade openness and absolute firm-specific variation.  Capital openness and its cross product with 
                                                           
5 Economic crises, by their very nature, are systematic.  They affect broad swaths of firms and 
industries simultaneously, and so are apparent as elevated systematic variation.  Firm-specific 
variation can rise too, for the crisis may affect some firms or sectors more than others, and may even 
present opportunities to some firms.  If crises also correspond to manias and panics, market swings 
due to noise trading might also heighten comovement.  15 
good government are both significantly related to higher firm-specific variation.  When both are 
included in 3.6, the individual coefficients are insignificant and capital openness per se switches sign.  
Although an F test shows the two to be jointly significant, collinearity problems make interpreting 
the point estimates problematic.  If we ignore such problems, a good government index above eleven 
induces a positive relationship between capital openness and absolute firm-specific variation.   
The center panel shows openness in trade significantly positively related to absolute 
systematic variation and unrelated to firm-specific variation.  The cross term between trade openness 
and good government in 3.9 is also positive and statistically significant.  Trade openness is associated 
with greater market-wide variation.   
The rightmost panel shows that trade openness is positively related to the comovement 
measure τ n ∅ .  When we include both trade openness and its cross term with good government in 3.17, 
trade openness has a positive coefficient while the cross term has a negative one; both insignificant.  
However, the F-statistic indicates joint significance.  In contrast, capital market openness is 
significantly associated with lower systematic variation relative to the total.  Again, the cross product 
with institutional development is significantly negative.  Both remain significant when included 
together in 3.20, however, capital openness takes a positive sign and the cross term becomes 
negative.  Including both trade and capital openness and both cross terms in 3.21 leaves the point 
estimates of the two capital openness terms virtually unchanged from 3.20.  The point estimates in 
3.21, which are both individually and jointly significant, imply that a good government index greater 
than nineteen makes the overall effect of capital openness on comovement negative.  The mean value 
for the good government measure is nineteen.   
 
Robustness Checks  
We repeat all our results using comovement measures estimated with a simple domestic market 16 
model, rather than [1].  Our results remain qualitatively similar, by which we mean the signs and 
statistical significance of regression coefficients in analogues to the tables shown are preserved.   
Likewise, using DataStream’s global market return, rather than the US market return, as the second 
factor in [1] produces qualitatively similar results.  Using value-weighting, rather than equal 
weighting, in constructing the local index also yields qualitatively similar results.   
As alternative comovement measures, we employ the average correlation between all 
possible pairs of thirty stocks, randomly selected in each country for each period, and the fraction of 
stocks moving with the market.  Regressions explaining logistic transformations of these measures of 
comovement closely resemble the regressions explaining  τ n ∅ .   
To ascertain that our results are not due to comovement changes associated with crises, we 
repeat our regressions dropping all observations for which any of the three crisis dummies described 
above is one.  The results are virtually unchanged, and the panel regression R
2s rise.  Dropping the 
crisis dummies and including all observations also generates results similar to those shown, as does 
including only country fixed effects.   
As a further robustness check, we use an alternative capital openness measure constructed by 
Abiad and Mody (2002).
6  Unfortunately, this is available only to 1996.  It yields a pattern of signs 
and coefficients similar to those shown, but with much lower significance levels, probably due to the 
smaller intersection of that measure with our comovement estimates.   
Substituting the simple trade openness measure of imports plus exports over GDP for the 
Frankel (2000) trade measure generates similar patterns of signs and significance to those shown.   
  Cook’s D statistics indicate that outliers are not driving our results.  Tests for 
                                                           
6 This measure adds score for aspects of capital openness: directed credit/reserve requirements, 
interest controls, entry barriers/pro-competition measures, regulation/securities markets, 
privatization, and international capital flows openness.  See Abiad and Mody (2002) for details.   17 
heteroskedasticity reject the need for modified t-tests.   
 
5.  A Case Study 
A case in point to illustrate the situation is the contrast between two Eastern European countries, 
Poland and Czech.  Both countries experienced a flurry of new legislation in 1991 and 1992 
establishing basic market economy institutions.  However, Glaeser et al. (2001) show that the two 
countries then followed very different trajectories.  The judicial systems remained ill developed in 
both countries.  However, strict Polish regulatory enforcement contrasted starkly with the hands-off 
regulation inspired by the libertarian philosophy of the Czech government.  Glaeser et al. (2001) 
argue that this stunted the development of the Czech financial system relative to that of Poland, and 
stress the need for law enforcement, by either the judiciary or regulators, to make markets work.   
  Neither country is included in our sample because of the unavailability of complete stock 
market and institutional development data.  However, by downloading daily data from DataStream 
and following precisely the same procedure outlined in section 3, we are able to construct a set of 
bimonthly comovement measures for these countries.
7   
  Figure 2 shows an upward trend in firm-specific variation in Poland and a downward trend in 
the Czech Republic in the latter years of the 1990s, as both opened their economies in preparation for 
accession to the European Union.  This is confirmed in Table 4, where Polish data shows a highly 
significant positive trend in 
2
ε σ  and negative trends in systematic variation, both absolute and 
relative to total variation.  Since a unit root cannot be rejected in the last of these measures, unit root 
invariant tests are used to confirm a significant negative trend in R
2.  In contrast, Czech shows no 
trend in
2
ε σ .  F-tests and bootstrapping (B) tests akin to those in Table 2 show an even greater 
                                                           
7 We are slowly constructing higher frequency comovement measures for more countries.   18 
contrast, indicating an actual decline in 
2
ε σ  for Czech stocks.  
Poland’s R
2 is much higher than its Czech counterpart early on, and falls to levels comparable 
with the latter as Polish market-wide variation abates.  However, simple convergence cannot be a 
complete explanation because Panel B shows Polish firm-specific variation concordantly rising from 
0.000954 to 0.001414; while Czech firm-specific variation falls from 0.000828 to 0.000573.  The 
contrast illustrates how opening is associated with reduced comovement and higher firm-specific 
variation only if the institutions protect private property rights. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
Firm-specific variation in individual stock returns rises, though not monotonically, during the 1990s 
in most, but not all, emerging markets.  Thus, the rising firm-specific variation detected by Morck et 
al. (2000) and Campbell et al. (2001) in US stocks is an international phenomenon.  
This effect seems related to globalization.  Greater capital market openness is associated with 
higher firm-specific variation and hence lower comovement in countries with institutional integrity 
(good government).  In contrast, goods market openness is generally associated with higher 
systematic variation, and hence greater comovement.   
  Unfortunately, individual stock returns are not electronically available in most countries 
before 1990.  This means we cannot control meaningfully for sectoral shocks and the like, and that 
the power of time series tests is low.  Thus our finding must be taken as preliminary.  Moreover, the 
interrelations among our openness variables, and between them and other measures of development, 
are doubtless complicated.  It may be that our openness measures are proxies for other more nuanced 
aspects of development.  With these caveats in mind, we can tentatively consider possible 
implications of our results.   
Although there is near uniform agreement among economists that trade openness is welfare 19 
enhancing, capital openness is subject to debate, with many, such as Bhagwati (1998) arguing that 
capital openness creates scope for destabilizing market-wide fluctuations – so-called ‘hot money’ 
problems.  Our results suggest that such concerns can be overstated.  We find market-wide 
fluctuations associated with trade openness, not capital openness.  In retrospect, this is reasonable, 
for trade openness is thought to induce greater specialization, converting industry effects into market-
wide fluctuations.  If this is really happening, further study along these lines seems warranted.   
Why capital openness is associated with higher firm-specific variation and lower 
comovement is at present unclear.  Candidate explanations include reduced tunneling due to greater 
transparency, a faster pace of creative destruction causing greater differences between innovators and 
laggards, less investor herding, and perhaps presently ill-understood differences in the cost structure 
of information and hence in the activity of informed arbitrageurs.  Nevertheless, Wurgler (2000), 
Durnev et al. (2004), and others find higher firm-specific variation related to greater stock market 
functional efficiency, which Tobin (1982) defines as asset prices inducing an efficient distribution of 
capital goods.   
Given these findings, and keeping the above mentioned caveats in mind, the magnitude of 
firm-specific variation in a country’s stocks presents itself as an interesting variable with which to 
examine institutional development, as suggested by the Czech-Poland comparison above.  Better 
institutions should cause the market to make a sharper distinction between firms with good prospects 
and firms with poor prospects and thus to allocate capital more efficiently.  We believe that these 
findings suggest a new and potentially useful measure of the effectiveness of reforms in different 
countries.  We tentatively propose that increasing firm-specific variation might be regarded as a 
gauge of the extent of real institutional reform.   
The view outlined here is not new.  In the Pure Theory of Capital, Hayek (1941, p. 6) argues 
that “[The] stock of capital is not an amorphous mass, but possesses a definite structure, that it is 
organized in a definite way, and that its composition of essentially different items is much more 20 
important than its aggregate ‘quantity’.”  In a healthy economy, Hayek argues, different companies 
undertake different investments because their managers possess different levels of entrepreneurial 
ability, openness to innovation, and foresight.  Some firms succeed and others fail as the economy 
grows through this ongoing process of creative destruction.   
We recognize that ours is not the final word, and invite alternative explanations of the 
patterns we detect.  We welcome ideas about how to distinguish such possibilities from the economic 
underpinnings we propose. 
 21 
References 
Abiad, Abdul and Ashoka Mody, “Status Quo Bias in Financial Reform. International Monetary 
Fund,” working paper (October 4, 2002). 
Bhagwati, Jagdesh, “The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Trade in 
Dollars,” Foreign Affairs 77:3 (1998), 7-12.  
Bekaert, Geert and Campbell Harvey, “Time-Varying World Market Integration,” Journal of 
Finance 50:2 (1995), 403-445.  
______ “Emerging Equity Market Volatility,” Journal of Financial Economics 43:1 (1997), 29-78.  
Beny, Laura, “A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and Market Theories of Insider 
Trading,” Harvard Law School Doctoral dissertation (2000). 
Bris, Arturo, William Goetzmann, and Ning Zhu, “Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets 
around the World,” Yale School of Management working paper (2002). 
Bushman, R., J. Piotroski, and A. Smith “What Determines Corporate Transparency?” University of 
North Carolina working paper (2002). 
Campbell, John, Martin Lettau, Burton G Malkiel and Yexiao Xu, “Have Individual Stocks Become 
More Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic risk,” Journal of Finance 56:1 
(2001), 1-43.  
Campbell, John and Robert Shiller, “Cointegration and Tests of Present Value Models,” Journal of 
Political Economy 95:5 (1987), 1062-1089.  
Caves, Richard, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 
1982). 
Chen, Zhiwu and Peter Knez., “Measurement of Market Integration and Arbitrage,” Review of 
Financial Studies 8(2) (1995), 287-325. 
Coffee, John, “Competition Among Securities Markets: A Path Dependent Perspective,” Columbia 22 
Law and Economics Working Paper 192 (2002). 
Collins, Daniel, S.P. Kothari, and Judy Rayburn, “Firm Size and the Information Content of Prices 
With Respect to Earnings,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 9 (1987), 111-138.  
Durnev, Artyom, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, and Paul Zarowin, “Does Greater Firm-specific 
Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?” Journal of Accounting 
Research, forthcoming (December 2003a). 
Durnev, Artyom, Merritt Fox, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung, “Law, Share Price Accuracy and 
Economic Performance,” Michigan Law Review, 102:3 (December 2003b).  
Durnev, Artyom, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung, “Value Enhancing Capital Budgeting and 
Firm-Specific Stock Returns Variation,” Journal of Finance 59:1, forthcoming (February 
2004). 
Edison, Hali and Francis Warnock, “A Simple Measure of the Intensity of Capital Controls,” IMF 
International Finance Discussion Paper 708 (2002).  
Forbes, Kristin and Roberto Rigobon, “No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock 
Market Comovements,” Journal of Finance 57:5 (2002), 2223-62. 
Frankel, Jeffrey, “Assessing the Efficiency Gain from Further Liberalization,” IMF working paper 
(2000). 
Glaeser, Edward, Simon Johnson, and Andrei Shleifer, “Coase Versus the Coasians,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 116 (2001), 853-899. 
Hayek, Friedrich, The Pure Theory of Capital, 1941.  
Hayek, Friedrich, “Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 4 (1945), 519-530. 
Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “Tunneling,” 
American Economic Review 90:2 (May 2000), 22-27. 
Karolyi, Andrew and Rene Stulz, “Issues in International Asset Pricing,” in George Constantinides, 
Milton Harris, and Rene Stulz (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Amsterdam: 23 
North-Holland, 2003).  
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salines, and Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership Around 
the World,” Journal of Finance 54:2 (1999), 471-517. 
Morck, Randall, Bernard Yeung, and Wayne Yu, “The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why 
Do Emerging Markets Have Comoving Stock Price Movements?” Journal of Financial 
Economics 58 (2000), 215-238.  
Morck, Randall, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung, “Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, 
and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease,” in R. Morck (Ed.), Concentrated Corporate 
Ownership (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000b).  
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales, “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial development 
in the Twentieth Century,” Journal of Financial Economics 69:1, July (2003), 5-50.  
Roll, Richard, “R
2,” Journal of Finance 43 (1988), 541-566. 
Schumpeter, Joseph, Theorie  der Wirtschaftlichen Entwichlung (Leipzig: Dunker und Humbolt, 
1912).  
Stulz, Rene M., “Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital,” Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 12:3 (1999), 30-39.  
Tobin, James, “On the Efficiency of the Financial System,” Lloyd’s Banking Review (July 1982).  
Vogelsang, Timothy, “Trend Function Hypothesis Testing in the Presence of Serial Correlation,” 
Econometrica 66:1 (1998), 123-148.  
West, Kenneth, “Dividend Innovations and Stock Price Volatility,” Econometrica 56:1 (1988), 37-
61. 
Wurgler, Jeffrey, “Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital,” Journal of Financial Economics 
58 (2000), 187-214. 24 
Table 1.  Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Comovement is measured by average market model R squared, 
2
τ n R , average firm-specific 
variation,
2
τ εσ n , and average systematic variation, 
2
τ σ n m .  Capital openness is value-weighted 
fraction of the market open to foreign investors. Trade openness is imports over GDP relative to 
GDP over world GDP.  Good government is a cross-section index taking low values where 
corruption is worse.  Data are for 1990 through 2001.   
 
Market 
2
τ n R  
2
τ εσ n  
2
τ σ n m  
Capital  
openness
 
Trade 
openness 
Good 
government
Brazil 0.1757  0.0080  0.0018  0.74  -0.87  20.24 
Chile 0.1625  0.0033  0.0007  0.81  -0.70  19.60 
Colombia 0.1448  0.0040  0.0007  0.66  -0.79  18.97 
Greece 0.2874  0.0054  0.0025  0.81  -0.74  21.01 
India 0.2516  0.0078  0.0027  0.19  -0.85  18.44 
Indonesia 0.1837  0.0093  0.0025  0.56  -0.71  15.40 
Korea 0.3006  0.0080  0.0028  0.36  -0.65  22.20 
Malaysia 0.4342  0.0037  0.0033  0.75  -0.10  22.76 
Mexico 0.2463  0.0036  0.0013  0.65  -0.72  18.61 
Pakistan 0.1987  0.0072  0.0018  0.59  -0.78  13.47 
Peru 0.1652  0.0077  0.0017  1.01  -0.82  14.92 
Philippines 0.1963  0.0085  0.0023  0.49  -0.54  12.94 
Portugal 0.1172  0.0039  0.0005  0.68  -0.62  24.85 
South Africa  0.0965  0.0087 0.0009  1.00  -0.77  23.07 
Taiwan   0.3922  0.0032  0.0027  0.23  .  25.13 
Thailand 0.2701  0.0065  0.0024  0.38  -0.53  20.17 
Turkey 0.3753  0.0087  0.0056  0.99  -0.75  18.13 
Mean 0.2352  0.0063  0.0021  0.64  -0.69  19.41 
Std 0.0978  0.0023  0.0012  0.25  0.18  3.67 
Minimum 0.0965  0.0032  0.0005  0.19  -0.87  12.94 
Maximum 0.4342  0.0093  0.0056  1.01  -0.10  25.13 
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Table 2.  Changes in Comovement Measures Between 1990 and 2001 
Comovement is measured by average market model R squared,
2
τ n R , average firm-specific 
variation,
2
τ εσ n , and average systematic variation, 
2
τ σ n m .   
 
Panel A. Trends in comovement from 1990 to 2001 are estimated with annual data assuming unit 
roots and then assuming their absence.  Because small samples render augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(DF) unit root tests problematic, we report both.  Figures shown are estimates x 10
2.   
Sample  Dependent variable  Trend estimates and p-levels  DF p-level
0.0630  0.0325  0.0304  0.0163  0.69  Absolute firm-specific 
variation, 
2
τ εσ n   (0.00)  (0.30)  (0.66)  (0.82)   
0.0126  0.0183  -0.0053  0.0118  0.30  Absolute systematic 
variation, 
2
τ σ n m   (0.17)  (0.02)  (0.89)  (0.77)   
-0.0105  -0.0033  -0.0167  -0.0091  0.00 
Emerging markets 
stocks, firm-week 
observations 
weighted equally  Relative systematic 
variation, 
2
τ n R   (0.11)  (0.31)  (0.43)  (0.61) 
 
0.0210  0.0080  0.0020  0.343  0.57  Absolute firm-specific 
variation, 
2
τ εσ n   (0.08)  (0.55)  (0.96)  (0.05)   
-0.0002  0.0046  -0.0173  -49.3  0.12  Absolute systematic 
variation, 
2
τ σ n m   (0.98)  (0.41)  (0.54)  (0.14)   
-0.00577  -0.205  -1.35  -27.9  0.00 
Emerging markets 
stocks, countries 
weighted equally 
Relative systematic 
variation, 
2
τ n R   (0.11)  (0.28)  (0.34)  (0.00) 
 
0.0013  -0.0003  -0.002  0.001  0.56  Absolute firm-specific 
variation, 
2
τ εσ n   (0.91)  (0.98)  (0.70)  (0.73)   
0.0016  0.0018  0.0008  2.19  0.43  Absolute systematic 
variation, 
2
τ σ n m   (0.02)  (0.13)  (0.68)  (0.95)    
0.479  0.552  0.328  19.7  0.61 
United States stocks 
Relative systematic 
variation, 
2
τ n R   (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.45)  (0.60)   
Unit root assumed in estimation  no  no  yes  yes   
Lagged dependent variable included  no  yes  no  yes   
 
Panel B.  Tests to reject equal firm-specific mean variation across subperiods. F-test degrees of 
freedom correspond to firm observations.  Bootstrap (B) test rejects equal average firm-specific 
variation in the two subperiods recalculate average first subperiod firm-specific variations one 
hundred times using thirty randomly selected stocks each time.  This provides a probability 
distribution for first subperiod average firm-specific variation.  The p-level is the mass in the tail of 
this distribution beyond the second subperiod sample average firm-specific variation.   
Subperiods are noncontiguous to mitigate autocorrelation and are of equal length.  All emerging 
market stocks are weighted equally regardless of country.  Variation figures are estimates x 10
2.   
  Emerging Markets  United States 
Comovement measure 
2
τ εσ n  
2
τ σ n m  
2
τ n R  
2
τ εσ n  
2
τ σ n m  
2
τ n R  
Mean variation, 90 to 94  0.629  0.169  0.242  0.310  0.0062  0.0483 
Mean variation, 97 to 01  1.236  0.308  0.234  0.295  0.0173  0.0723 
Change in mean variation  0.607  0.138  -0.008  -0.015  0.0111  0.0240 
F-test p-level to reject no change  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
B- test p-level to reject no change  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.41)  (0.44)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
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Panel C.  Trends and changes in firm-specific variation by emerging market.  Trends are estimated 
as in Panel A, changes as in Panel B.   
Country  Period  Trend estimates and p-levels
 a 
DF test 
p-level 
Sub-
period 
2
τ εσ n
a  2
τ ε σ n ∆
a  F test  
p-level
B test  
p-level
Brazil  95-01  0.687  -0.028  -0.034 -0.019  0.65  95-97  1.538  -0.136  0.00  0.31 
     (0.18)  (0.72)  (0.30)  (0.46)    99-01  1.402         
Chile  91-01  0.067  -0.054  -0.010 -0.028  0.00  91-95  0.655  -0.180  0.00  0.07 
     (0.24)  (0.34)  (0.22)  (0.08)     97-01  0.475          
Colombia  93-97  -0.072  -0.021  0.006  -0.003  0.15  93-94  0.489  0.583  0.00  0.00 
     (0.60)  (0.59)  (0.29)  (0.68)     96-97  1.072          
Greece  90-01  0.178  -0.065  0.002  -0.021  0.08  90-94  0.646  -0.019  0.00  0.44 
     (0.31)  (0.42)  (0.93)  (0.33)     97-01  0.628          
India  90-01  0.159  0.016  0.021  0.026  0.18  90-94  0.924  0.540  0.00  0.03 
     (0.55)  (0.81)  (0.25)  (0.10)     97-01  1.463          
Indonesia  90-01  0.439  0.026  0.061  0.082  0.35  90-94  0.714  0.990  0.00  0.00 
     (0.12)  (0.90)  (0.27)  (0.08)     97-01  1.703          
Korea  90-01  0.372  0.055  0.020  0.126  0.66  90-94  0.308  1.411  0.00  0.00 
     (0.11)  (0.74)  (0.68)  (0.02)     97-01  1.722          
Malaysia  90-01  0.134  0.004  0.013  0.014  0.07  90-94  0.386  0.185  0.00  0.00 
     (0.32)  (0.95)  (0.34)  (0.20)     97-01  0.571          
Mexico  90-01  0.135  0.004  0.014  0.013  0.12  90-94  0.455  0.260  0.00  0.02 
     (0.41)  (0.91)  (0.12)  (0.05)     97-01  0.716          
Pakistan  93-01  0.136  0.033  0.009  0.021  0.17  93-96  0.903  0.795  0.00  0.09 
     (0.70)  (0.63)  (0.60)  (0.29)     98-01  1.699          
Peru  92-01  0.099  -0.063  -0.081 -0.102  0.02  92-95  1.447  -0.469  0.00  0.00 
     (0.18)  (0.42)  (0.24)  (0.00)     98-01  0.977          
Philippines  90-01  0.386  0.017  0.023  0.047  0.66  90-94  1.015  0.551  0.00  0.00 
     (0.11)  (0.82)  (0.34)  (0.01)     97-01  1.566          
Portugal  90-01  -0.117  0.004  0.002  0.004  0.00  90-94  0.705  0.197  0.00  0.09 
     (0.61)  (0.89)  (0.88)  (0.61)     97-01  0.902          
South Africa  90-01  0.142  0.066  0.079  0.095  0.92  90-94  0.884  0.646  0.00  0.00 
     (0.31)  (0.23)  (0.02)  (0.00)     97-01  1.530          
Taiwan  90-01  0.063  -0.003  0.029  0.020  0.47  90-94  0.287  0.228  0.00  0.00 
     (0.22)  (0.94)  (0.00)  (0.15)     97-01  0.515          
Thailand  90-01  0.371  -0.010  0.017  0.043  0.47  90-94  0.517  1.064  0.00  0.00 
     (0.16)  (0.95)  (0.53)  (0.20)     97-01  1.581          
Turkey  90-01  0.470  -0.046  -0.023 -0.029  0.13  90-94  1.231  -0.394  0.00  0.01 
     (0.15)  (0.58)  (0.32)  (0.07)    97-01  0.837          
Unit root assumed   yes  yes  no  no             
Dependent variable 
lag included  yes  no  yes  no             
a. Trend and variation figures are estimates x 10
2.   27 
Table 3.  Panel Regressions  
Independent variables include capital openness, a value-weighted fraction of the market open to foreign investors; trade openness, 
imports over GDP relative to GDP over world GDP; and interactions with good government, a cross-section index taking low values 
where corruption is worse.  The Peso crisis dummy is one for Latin American countries in 1995, and zero otherwise.  The Asian Crisis 
dummy is one for Asian countries in 1997 and 1998, and zero otherwise.  The Real crisis dummy is one for Latin American countries in 
1998, and zero otherwise. Data are for 1990 through 2001.  The dependent variables are as indicated.  All regressions include year and 
country fixed effects.   
Dependent variable  Logarithm of idiosyncratic variation, 
2
τ εσ n Logarithm of systematic variation, 
2
τ σ n m  
Logistic transformation of systematic 
variation as fraction of total variation, 
2
τ n R
Regression  3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9  3.10 3.11 3.12  3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 3.18 3.19 3.20 3.21
Trade openness  1.18 
(.19)    -2.04 
(.52)      .28 
(.93)
3.15
 
(.00)   -0.03
(.99)     .38 
(.92)
1.97
 
(.01)   2.02
(.48)     .11 
(.97)
Trade openness x 
good government    -.07 
(.12) 
.17 
(.29)      .05 
(.77)   .17 
(.00)
.17 
(.39)     .16 
(.44)   .10 
(.02)
-
.0026
(.99)
    .11 
(.46)
Capital  openness      .78 
(.00)   -.88
(.51)
-1.50
(.34)     .35 
(.29)   1.84
(.32)
1.45
(.46)     -.43
(.08)   2.72
(.05)
2.96
(.04)
Capital openness x 
good government       .04 
(.00)
.08 
(.21)
.11 
(.15)      .01 
(.37) 
-.07
(.41)
-.04
(.64)      -.02
 
(.03)
-.15
(.02)
-.15
(.03)
Peso Crisis Dummy  .46 
(.05) 
.46 
(.05) 
.47 
(.05) 
.44 
(.05)
.44 
(.05)
.45 
(.05)
.44 
(.05)
1.10
 
(.00)
1.11
(.00)
1.11
(.00)
1.08
(.00)
1.09 
(.00) 
1.08
(.00)
1.08
(.00)
.64 
(.00)
.64 
(.00)
.64 
(.00)
.64 
(.01)
.65 
(.01)
.63 
(.01)
.64 
(.00)
Asian Crisis 
Dummy 
.47 
(.01) 
.47 
(.01) 
.49 
(.01) 
.37 
(.03)
.38 
(.02)
.39 
(.02)
.46 
(.01)
.63 
(.00)
.66 
(.00)
.66 
(.00)
.57 
(.01)
.58 
(.01) 
.56 
(.02)
.61 
(.01)
.16 
(.30)
.18 
(.24)
.16 
(.31)
.20 
(.25)
.20 
(.24)
.17 
(.31)
.15 
(.35)
Real Crisis Dummy  -.15 
(.58) 
-.15 
(.58) 
-.14 
(.60) 
-.11
(.68)
-.10
(.70)
-.09
(.72)
-.13
(.63)
.20 
(.55)
.20 
(.53)
.20 
(.54)
.30 
(.40)
.30 
(.40) 
.29 
(.42)
.19 
(.56)
.35 
(.15)
.35 
(.15)
.35 
(.15)
.41 
(.13)
.41 
(.13)
.38 
(.15)
.32 
(.18)
F Statistic for 
openness terms  .19 .12 .24 .00 .00 .00
  .00
  .00
  .00
  .01
  .29 .37 .41 .02 .01
  .02 .05 .08 .03 .01 .02 
Regression R
2  .59 .60 .60 .63 .63 .63 .63 .72 .72 .72 .67 .67 .67 .73 .75 .75 .75 .72 .72 .73 .77 
Sample  136 136 135 150 150 149 133 136 136 135 150 150 149 133 136 136 135 150 150 149 133
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Table 4.  Trend Tests for Czech and Polish Data 
 
Panel A.  Trends in firm-specific variation from 1990 to 2001 in each country, estimated using 
bimonthly data.  Estimates assuming no unit root are coefficients on time index in regressions of 
levels.  Estimates assuming a unit root are intercepts in regressions of first differences.   
   Czech Republic  Poland 
 
2
τ εσ n  
2
τ σ n m  
2
τ n R  
2
τ εσ n  
2
τ σ n m  
2
τ n R  
Augmented Dickey Fuller p-level  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.07  0.22 
Trend tests assuming no unit root             
   Dependent variable lag structure 
a  1, 3, 4  5  0  1  1  1 
   Trend estimate x 10
5  -3.87 
b  -2.28 
b  -0.00216 6.51
 b  -4.16
 b  -0.0486
 
   P-level  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Trend tests assuming unit root                 
   Dependent variable lag structure 
a          1  1, 6 
   Trend estimate x 10
5          2.90 
b  -0.00494
   P-level          (0.84)  (0.61) 
Unit root invariant tests 
c                   
   1% p-level if statistic < -2.65  -0.447  -0.135  -0.722  -0.149  -0.0123  -1.43 
   2.5% p-level if statistic < -2.15  -0.677  -0.302  -1.13  -0.288  -0.0688  -2.24 
   5% p-level if statistic < -1.72  -0.852  -0.471  -1.44  -0.414  -0.178  -2.87 
a. Dependent variable lags of one through six two-month periods are assumed initially. A stepwise 
algorithm eliminates the least significant lag, reruns the regression, and repeats until all remaining lags 
are significant at 10% p-levels. Zero indicates all were eliminated. Czech sample is 44 bimonthly 
observations (Sept./Oct. 94 to Nov./Dec. 01); Polish is 45 observations (July/Aug. 94 to Nov./Dec. 01).   
b.  Reported value is estimate multiplied by 10
6. 
c.  Using the method of Vogelsang (1998).    
 
 
Panel B.  Tests rejecting equal firm-specific variation across subperiods. F-test degrees of 
freedom correspond to firm observations.  Bootstrap (B) test recalculates average first subperiod 
firm-specific variations one hundred times using thirty randomly selected stocks each time.  This 
provides a probability distribution for first subperiod average firm-specific variation.  The p-level 
is the mass in the tail of this distribution beyond the second subperiod sample average firm-
specific variation.  Subperiods are noncontiguous to mitigate autocorrelation and are of equal 
length.  All emerging market stocks are weighted equally regardless of country.   
  Czech Republic  Poland 
Comovement measure 
2
τ εσ n
a  2
τ σ n m
a  2
τ n R  
2
τ εσ n
a  2
τ σ n m
a  2
τ n R  
Mean variation, 95 to 97   8.28   0.340   0.0418  0.0954   0.0425   0.346 
Mean variation, 99 to 01   5.73   0.080   0.0121  0.1414   0.0119   0.095 
Change in mean variation  -2.55  -0.260  -0.0297  0.0460  -0.0306  -0.251 
F-test p-level to reject no change   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
B- test p-level to reject no change   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
a.  Reported absolute variations are estimates x 10
4.   29 
Figure 1. Changing Comovement in Individual Stocks in Emerging Market  
Annual comovement measures are derived from market model regressions of weekly individual 
stock returns on domestic and US market returns, and include the average regression R
2, the 
systematic (explained) variation in the average stock’s returns, and the firm-specific (residual) 
variation in the average stock’s returns. 
 
Panel A.  Averages with each country weighted equally 
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Panel B.  Averages across all stocks without regard for country 
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Figure 2.  Variance Decomposition of Individual Stock Returns in Poland and the 
Czech Republic 
Bimonthly comovement measures are derived from market model regressions of daily individual 
stock returns on domestic and US market returns, and include the average regression R
2, the 
systematic (explained) variation in the average stock’s returns, and the firm-specific (residual) 
variation in the average stock’s returns. 
 
Panel A.  Poland 
 
Panel B.  The Czech Republic 
 
Note:  Systematic and firm-specific variation are plotted on the left axis, R squared is on the right axis.   
Table 4 variation tests are based on a single regression for each firm across each subperiod, and are 
therefore not directly comparable with the annual regression figures displayed here.   
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